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Abstract 
The inevitable climate challenges facing the Asia-Pacific territory require a massive whole-of-
government approach comparable to the Marshall Plan of 1948.  While many political leaders 
have called for such a plan, no policy currently exists for this region or purpose.  With nearly 
eight trillion dollars in trade revenue passing through crucially strategic straits daily, seven of the 
ten largest militaries in the world (five of which are nuclear capable) operating throughout this 
territory, and a forecast for nearly exponential population growth, the geopolitical provenance of 
the United States ties inextricably to this portion of the globe.  A document analysis assessing 
existing diplomatic, developmental, and defensive policies concludes that a modern-day 
Marshall Plan for the 21st century Asia-Pacific is achievable by realigning lines of effort within 
current frameworks.  As long as the United States continues to deny climate change, other 
nation-state actors within the area will rise to fill the void.  The United States must commit to the 
funding, development, and proliferation of clean and sustainable energy solutions which evolve 
past current fossil-fuel reliant technologies, and most importantly, be open-source in description 
and shared with other large polluters throughout the world.  Finally, the nations of the Asian-
Pacific realm should contemplate a theater-specific treaty organization.  As climate change 
threatens to destabilize the region, a unified force intent on providing stabilization efforts, 
preventing internal conflict and escalation, and enforcing international law deserves 
consideration and deliberation. 
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A Marshall Plan for the 21st Century: Addressing Climate Change in the Asia-Pacific  
Through Diplomacy, Development, & Defense 
 
“General Marshall will be known as one of those who brought this new era into being. But he 
would be the first to agree that it is more than the creation of statesmen. It comes from the minds 
and hearts of all the people. Our peoples are united in their determination to work together to 
deal with the basic problems of human life.” 
-Harry S Truman, President of the United States, 1945-1953 
 
Introduction 
As Europe began the slow process of recovery following the cataclysm of World War II, 
the economies of the Western world struggled to grow and prosper.  The United States, with 
industrial and financial industries operating at peak performance, understood that without a 
stable and flourishing Europe, the American economy would inevitably suffer without reliable 
and credible trading partners (Diebold, W., 1947).  Simultaneously, as Communism took root in 
Eastern Europe and began to spread to the farthest reaches of the globe, the paralysis of the 
United States to take action to contain this existential threat was plunging the world into further 
chaos.  As nation after nation fell to communist ideologies, the United States was compelled to 
respond in order to prevent freedom and democracy from becoming a minority ideology in the 
new Soviet world order.   
In 1948, the European Recovery Program, also known as “The Marshall Plan” was 
passed with a majority vote in the United States Congress (80th Congress, 2004).  The Marshall 
Plan had three independent and equally important objectives for Europe: massive diplomatic 
initiatives, large-scale development projects, and ground-breaking defensive enterprises.  The 
three pillars of the Marshall Plan were funded by an allocation of fifteen billion dollars over a 
span of five years from 1948-1953 (United States Department of State Office of the Historian, 
n.d.).  While the true intentions and impacts of the Marshall Plan to the overall recovery of 
Europe may be up for debate, history shows that Europe began to flourish (Kunz, D., 1997).  
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Factories reopened, alliances were signed, optimism swelled, Communism receded, and Europe 
once again thrived (Leffler, M., 1998).  These outcomes demonstrate how taking action during a 
critical time was not only necessary, but intrinsic to the survival of the United States and 
Western ideals.   
Over 70 years after the passing of the Marshall Plan, another silent and nascent threat is 
growing throughout the world.  Global greenhouse gas emissions are growing at an ever-
increasing rate, contributing to average global temperatures warming at a level that is 
unsustainable for the future welfare and stability of humanity.  Climate change is an existential 
hazard that dwarfs the threat of the Soviet Union in magnitude and scope.  Warming global 
temperatures have the potential to contribute to more frequent and extreme weather phenomena, 
further contributing to social upheaval.  Droughts, famine, super-typhoons, and public health 
crisis will all become more prevalent and severe, inevitably resulting in additional resource 
scarcity (IPCC, 2014).  From freshwater shortages to constricting growing seasons and smaller 
crop yields, climate-related resource loss is projected to increase while global populations 
continue to rise (United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population 
Division, 2015).  Resource scarcity has the potential to result in mass human migrations as 
communities are forced to leave their coastal or rural homelands in order to find relief in urban 
towns and megacities alike.  Following resource scarcity, the mass migration of climate refugees 
may amplify the possibility of conflict, whether it be through radicalization of the 
disenfranchised, or nuclear war between nations vying for energy security.  
When comparing post-World War II Europe to the post-climate change Asia-Pacific, the 
similarities in the urgency for action demand consideration.  Just as the influence of Communism 
quickly spread throughout war-ravaged and vulnerable nations, the window to achieve 
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meaningful progress against climate change is rapidly coming to a close, and the most powerful 
governments of the world are showing no signs of taking action.  Current assessments indicate 
that the planet has approximately twelve years until the consequences of climate change will be 
irreversible and uncontrollable (IPCC, 2018).  Once the opportunity to act against climate change 
has passed, the cascading consequences of an ecosystem in peril will inescapably cause chaos, 
instability, and threaten the security of all nations.  Just as the United States was dependent upon 
Europe for economic opportunities after World War II and throughout the twentieth century, the 
globally interconnected marketplaces of today rely on the nations of the Asia-Pacific as a labor-
force nucleus.  As the European Recovery Program was envisioned to preserve and protect 
Europe from economic and social collapse in 1948, a similar policy of size, importance, and 
resolve is needed today for the Asia-Pacific realm. 
A new Marshall Plan to address climate change for the 21st century Asia-Pacific is 
necessary to preserve the economic prosperity of the United States, maintain the supremacy of 
influence of the United States throughout the region, and most importantly, reduce the human 
suffering that climate change will inevitably cause.  Numerous politicians, from former Vice 
Presidents to freshman Representatives in the United States Congress, have repeatedly called for 
a “New Marshall Plan” to combat climate change.  However, these individuals focus on strictly 
developmental projects such as clean energy initiatives, and policies to reduce carbon footprints.  
While these efforts play a role in the overall effort against climate change, they are only one part 
of what the original Marshall Plan encompassed, and a new Marshall Plan requires.  The original 
Marshall Plan relied upon the three pillars of diplomacy, development, and defense; all were 
equally important and critical to overall success.  The scale and scope of a Marshall Plan for the 
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21st century Asia-Pacific, will undoubtedly require developmental objectives, but not at the 
expense of diplomatic and defensive efforts as well. 
While politicians, scientists, and concerned citizens alike have all called for a “new 
Marshall Plan” to combat climate change, no one has determined what a new plan would look 
like, how much it would cost, who the stakeholders would be, and how they would all interact.  
The objective of this thesis is to act as a framework where existing organizations, policies, 
programs, and agencies can realign to provide unity of effort to address climate change, thus, 
acting as a new Marshall Plan.  Although current partisanship will most likely prohibit the 
passing of a massive whole-of-government approach of this scale, the threat of climate change 
pervades.  If and when the time comes for when the United States is ready to act against climate 
change in the Asia-Pacific, this thesis intends to act as a blueprint to facilitate action. 
The primary inspiration for this thesis originates from the article “A Climate-Security 
Plan for the Asia-Pacific Rebalance: Lessons from the Marshall Plan. The U.S. Asia-Pacific 
Rebalance, National Security and Climate Change” by Francesco Femia and Caitlin Werrell.  
Published by the American Security Project Center for Climate and Security, the article is the 
closest iteration of what can specifically be done to create a new Marshall Plan for the Asia-
Pacific to handle the climate challenges of the 21st century.  This thesis dramatically expands the 
scope of the article and details specific actions to magnify diplomatic, developmental, and 
defensive efforts in the Asia-Pacific region. 
The research focus of this thesis desires to illustrate three crucial issues: 
1. The creation of a new Marshall Plan for the Asia-Pacific to address climate change lacks 
critical investigation.  While numerous agencies and institutions have called on the necessity of 
such a plan, no plan currently exists to realign current policies, agencies, and frameworks to 
accomplish this objective. 
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2. The urgency of addressing climate change is rapidly approaching a period in time requiring a 
commitment to action.  By developing a plausible framework for creating, funding, and executing 
a new Marshall Plan, this thesis hopes to expedite action when the desire for action presents 
itself. 
 
3. Creating a whole-of-government approach to combat climate change in the Asia-Pacific is 
necessary to reduce human suffering, minimize economic strife, maintain a favorable security 
posture towards the United States, and achieve the strategic objectives of the United States 
throughout the region. 
 
Having a plan in place for a policy of this magnitude cannot be overstated.  Due to the 
slow-moving nature of bureaucracy, when the will to act presents itself, execution cannot be 
hindered by administrative processes.  By developing a framework preemptively, this thesis will 
expedite and facilitate the creation of a new Marshall Plan and advance climate action for this 
highly vulnerable region. 
This thesis aims to illustrate the need for and to develop a potential framework that 
realigns current diplomatic, developmental, and defensive policies towards resisting climate 
change in the Asia-Pacific.  This thesis investigates the following research questions: 
1. What mechanisms and programs are already in place to assist in diplomacy, development, and 
defense in the Asia-Pacific region? 
 
2. By realigning the frameworks of these programs, how can streamlining unity of effort and 
financial assistance maximize a whole-of-government approach? 
 
3. How should the burden of addressing the financial requirements for climate change 
mitigations and adaptations be equitably divided between all stakeholders throughout the 
region? 
 
The original Marshall Plan placed equal importance on diplomacy, development, and defense.  
This thesis will continue those themes by accomplishing the following three objectives: 
1. Identify diplomatic mechanisms that the United States Department of State can utilize to 
maintain influence and partiality throughout the region. 
 
2. Explore developmental funding sources and identify how their frameworks may be intertwined 
to expeditiously and efficiently allocate funds to mitigate, adapt, and resist climate change. 
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3. Determine if current United States Department of Defense strategic guidance for the Asia-
Pacific overlaps and shares commonality with what a new Marshall Plan to fight climate change 
in the region would require. 
 
In order to sustain American leadership in the Asia-Pacific region, the United States 
requires a 21st-century foreign policy initiative on the scale of the Marshall Plan that promotes 
diplomatic, developmental, and defensive efforts to combat climate change.  While the poorest 
and smallest nations of the world will undoubtedly pay the highest price, climate change impacts 
the providences of all countries.  Only by ascending to a position of leadership on the issue of 
climate change will the United States lead this critically strategic, yet highly vulnerable region 




























A MARSHALL PLAN FOR THE ASIA-PACIFIC 12 
 “It is logical that the United States should do whatever it is able to do to assist in the return of 
normal economic health to the world, without which there can be no political stability and no 
assured peace. Our policy is not directed against any country, but against hunger, poverty, 
desperation, and chaos. Any government that is willing to assist in recovery will find full co-
operation on the part of the United States of America.” 
-George C. Marshall, Secretary of State, 1950-1951 
 
Literature Review 
According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), a broad consensus 
exists in academia who agree that the consequences of climate change will negatively impact the 
globe in an unpredictable manner (IPCC, 2014).  These researchers believe that rising sea levels, 
warming ocean temperatures, changing currents, migrating fish stocks, and increases in marine 
acidification and salinity all have the potential to disrupt the current global economic and 
geopolitical status quo. (Lee, 2015).  Current literature points to the Asia-Pacific, which spans 
from the Indian Ocean to the farthest eastern Pacific Islands, as the most vulnerable territory in 
the world and one that already experiences the impacts of a changing climate (Sawhney, P. & M. 
Perkins, 2015). Seven out of ten of the largest militaries in the world reside in a region where 
five nuclear powers are vying for control in this resource-rich environment (Femia, F., & 
Werrell, C. E., 2015).  According to the Center for Climate Security (2015), over 80 percent of 
global commerce transits Asia-Pacific straits, and over eight trillion dollars in commercial trade 
pass through these waters daily.  Senior military officials, including former United States Indo-
Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) Commanders, emphasize how this portion of the globe 
will serve as the geopolitical focal point and epicenter throughout the 21st century and beyond 
(Locklear III, S., 2015).  The United States will undoubtedly maintain a presence and play a 
critical role in providing stability within this region; however, the need for an all-encompassing 
strategic plan that follows a whole-of-government approach to combat climate change urgently 
requires development.  Climate experts agree that without an actionable plan to combat climate 
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change the United States risks losing the supremacy of influence that has been relied upon for the 
last 70 years to other rising powers (Femia, F., & Werrell, C. E., 2015).  
This literature review will provide justification for a modern version of the Marshall Plan 
for the Asia-Pacific region by comparing the historical context of the European Recovery 
Program in post-war Europe to the modern challenges facing a post-climate change Asia-Pacific.  
By providing an in-depth analysis of the current climate challenges facing the Asia-Pacific, and 
following the diplomacy, development, and defense framework provided by the original 
Marshall Plan, this literature review will show that the rationalization for a new plan for the 21st 
century is essential and grounded in precedence. 
Historical Context 
In the aftermath of World War II, as Europe struggled to emerge from the ashes of 
catastrophic war while simultaneously resisting the rise of Communism and the Soviet Union, 
the United States recognized that without a stable, secure, and prosperous Europe, global 
economic growth would remain stagnant (Diebold Jr, W., 1947).  In order to incentivize 
economic progress, develop cooperative security relationships, and counter the growing Soviet 
influence, the United States acknowledged the need for a massive whole-of-government foreign 
policy (Clayton, W.C., 1963, pg. 497).  In 1948, Congress took action by passing the Marshall 
Plan with bipartisan approval.  Also known as the European Recovery Program (ERP), the 
Marshall Plan would invest 15 billion dollars, equating to over 100 billion dollars in 2019, into 
economic stimulus programs to encourage European economies to rapidly grow (Dornbusch, R., 
Nölling, W., & Layard, R., 1993).  Historians today remain divided over the effectiveness of the 
Marshall Plan and continue to debate the impact of American influence on post-war Europe.  
Some academics argue that the ERP acted exclusively as the primary mechanism that allowed 
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Europe to flourish in the post-war years (Kunz, D., 1997).  Others contend that economic revival 
had already begun, and the Marshall Plan merely accelerated imminent economic growth 
(Dornbusch, R. et al., 1993).  However, putting the specifics of these arguments aside, an 
overwhelming majority of historians, economists, and academics agree that the Marshall Plan 
laid the framework for what went on to become the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD), as well as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (Kugler, L., 
1990), two of the most influential organizations in the European Union today. 
Additionally, numerous scholars believe that a primary objective of the Marshall Plan not 
only intended to provide economic stimulus but to counter growing Soviet aggression and 
prevent internal nation-state conflict (Leffler, M., 1998).  While the actual impact of the Marshall 
Plan remains up for interpretation, European countries saw industrial production rates climb 
from a low of 87 percent of the pre-war level to 135 percent of the pre-war level in only four 
years; an astronomical growth rate in the years immediately following a globally destructive war 
(Eichengreen, B., 2010).  Aside from purely economic metrics, the Marshall Plan signified the 
intent of the United States to establish a long-term commitment to the region.  The Asia-Pacific 
region requires a robust and undeviating plan that shows a long-term commitment to remain 
engaged to combat the emerging existential threats the a changing climate presents. 
Although world geopolitics and have changed since 1948, the lessons learned from the 
Marshall Plan can unquestionably play a role today in facing the uncertainty surrounding the 
Asia-Pacific expanse in regards to a changing climate.  A massive whole-of-government 
approach to a policy designed to prevent internal conflict, alleviate economic and environmental 
disaster, pave the foundation for a coalition of military alliances, and resist the influence and 
impact of climate change certainly echo with the same themes and intent of the Marshall Plan 
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from years ago.  Therefore, the Marshall Plan should serve as an inspiring guideline for what the 
United States accomplishes when the whole-of-government unifies in effort; and should be 
revisited for lessons, policies, and strategies that can also be applied to fighting climate change in 
the Asia-Pacific realm today. 
A New Context for a New Plan 
While post-war Europe before the Marshall Plan acts as a juxtaposition to the Asia-
Pacific realm of today, Asia-Pacific economies continue to cultivate vigorous financial and 
societal growth (International Monetary Fund, 2018).  According to the United Nations 
Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP) (2013), urbanization 
among Asia-Pacific countries are resulting in some of the fastest growing megacities in the world 
and show no signs of abating.  The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) reports that growing middle classes will for the first time in generations have excess 
income to invest in non-critical goods and services.  This growing population of over two billion 
people represents 66 percent of the total global middle-class growth projected to occur by the 
year 2030 (OECD, 2012).  Commercial shipping through critically strategic straits continues to 
increase and currently exceeds two-way trade revenues of over eight trillion dollars per day 
(Femia, F., & Werrell, C. E., 2015).  Hydrocarbon exploration and mining are accelerating to 
quench the energy demands of billions of people living in coastal communities (Chen, S., 2008).  
Finally, military buildups on contested islands are further exacerbating tensions in the region due 
to exclusive economic zone encroachment (Amer, R., 2014).  While all of these socioeconomic 
variables are challenging to manage exclusively, they are inferior to the consequences climate 
change will have on these growing nations. 
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Conversely to mid-20th century Europe where the threat of encroaching Communism 
became more apparent than the nascent consequences of a changing climate, the effects of 
climate change have the potential to morph the geography for centuries into the future.  The 
Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific assesses that rising sea levels are existential 
threats to coastal populations and a multitude of island nations (see Figure 1) (Kondoch, B., & 
Howe, B., 2014), creating some of the first climate refugees of the modern era (Farbotko, C., & 
Lazrus, H., 2012).   
 
Figure 1. Asia-Pacific coastal cities and accompanying percentages of urban populations in low 
elevation coastal zones (LECZ) (Fuchs, R. J., 2010). 
 
Furthermore, climatologists agree that warming ocean temperatures are impacting the 
seasonal monsoon winds, causing the frequency and severity of monsoons, typhoons, and super-
typhoons to increase (Kothawale, D. R., Munot, A. A., & Borgaonkar, H. P., 2007).  Increasing 
marine acidification and salination are bleaching coral ecosystems that have previously survived 
for millions of years, impacting native flora and fauna habitats, as well as the people who depend 
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on them (Anthony, K. R., Kline, D. I., Diaz-Pulido, G., Dove, S., & Hoegh-Guldberg, O., 2008).  
In addition to overharvesting to feed the growing coastal populations (see Figure 2), climate 
change disrupts the yearly migration patterns of pelagic fish species such a tuna, pushing 
migration patterns further and further north (Rijnsdorp, A. D., Peck, M. A., Engelhard, G. H., 
Mollmann, C., & Pinnegar, J. K., 2009).  Fishing rights disputes are causing friction for the 
fisheries industries in the Asia-Pacific, as fish stocks reside more and more in contested 
territories (Pomeroy, R. et al., 2007).  The current consensus in academia believes that the 
culmination of these environmental factors will lead to eventual resource scarcity (Nordas, R., & 
Gleditsch, N. P., 2007).  The American Security Project’s “Global Security and Defense Index 
for Climate Change” agrees with this assessment and adds that instability from resource loss has 
the potential to cause conflict among nation-states throughout this highly-charged and strategic 
region (Masys, A. J., 2018). 
 
Figure 2. Projected population growth for the Asia-Pacific region from 1950-2050. 
(United Nations World Urbanization Prospects, 2014). 
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The United States requires a new Marshall Plan for the Asia-Pacific climate change threat 
to ensure prosperity, commercial success, and defensive cohesion in the 21st century.  The Asian 
Development Bank (ADB) assesses that the current initiatives are lacking in innovation and 
action, causing frustration among Asia-Pacific nations who look to the United States for 
leadership and guidance (ADB, 2017).  In order to sustain American influence and security 
cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region, the United States needs a 21st-century foreign policy 
initiative on the scale of the Marshall Plan to combat climate change (Femia, F., & Werrell, C. 
E., 2015).  By following the diplomacy, development, and defense framework outlined by the 
Marshall Plan, the United States has an opportunity to capitalize on climate change as a 
mechanism to strengthen current alliances, promote security cooperation with non-alliance states, 
provide stability throughout an economically critical region, and most importantly, create a ready 
and willing coalition to combat the changing climate. 
Pillar I: Diplomacy 
In order for the United States to succeed diplomatically in the Asia-Pacific, current 
alliances with partner nations require further maintenance and enrichment (Femia, F., & Werrell, 
C. E., 2015).  The United States should be engaging with countries who are not official allies 
since the success of this wide-ranging climate change policy will not succeed without full unity 
of effort among all regional stakeholders (Femia, F., & Werrell, C. E., 2015).  Climate change 
can stand as a common threat to all nations and can serve as a unifier to countries who previously 
may have harbored animosity to the United States (Holland, A., 2015).  Fortunately, numerous 
robust diplomatic mechanisms already exist which will aid the United States in climate change 
diplomacy efforts (Femia, F., & Werrell, C. E., 2015). 
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At the 44th Pacific Islands Forum in 2013, the Majuro Declaration was created to elicit 
specific pledges for greenhouse gas emission reductions (Majuro Declaration, 2013).  The 
Majuro Declaration intends to highlight firm, global political commitments to the Pacific region, 
to accelerate the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, and to provide a voice for the Smaller 
Islands States Leaders (Mulalap, C., 2015).  Leaders throughout the Asia-Pacific region 
recognize the need to improve national policy mechanisms to facilitate climate change financing 
(Majuro Declaration, 2013).  Additionally, the Majuro Declaration seeks to simplify current 
financial, technological, and diplomatic efforts to channel financial resources to the issues seen 
as having the greatest relevance to the countries most at risk (Majuro Declaration, 2013).  While 
the Majuro Declaration advocates for forward-leaning action to unify global efforts to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions, the statement fails to emphasize the need for bi-lateral enterprises 
between the largest polluter-states in the world: the United States, China, and India.  While the 
Majuro Declaration remains an essential document in fostering a commitment to reduce global 
greenhouse gases, the countries that have signed and ratified the Majuro Declaration are some of 
the smallest polluters on the planet, and therefore will have the smallest impact on reducing 
greenhouse gas accumulation.  Bi-lateral or multi-lateral partnerships between the largest 
polluters in the region require consideration in addition to the Majuro Declaration in order to 
stop the advancement and potentially reverse the effects of climate change. 
In addition to the Majuro Declaration, the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) established the Kyoto Protocol as a diplomatic device that attempts 
to curtail greenhouse gas emissions.  One of the most insightful aspects of the Kyoto Protocol 
acknowledges the varying degrees of economic development and how different countries each 
have unique capabilities in the fight against climate change (UNFCCC, 2008).  National capacity 
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remains an important aspect that should be contemplated in a new Marshall Plan for the Asia-
Pacific, considering the varying degrees of economic and industrial development throughout the 
region.  However, like the original Marshall Plan, the effectiveness of the Kyoto Protocol 
continues to invite debate.  Some researchers believe that the Kyoto Protocol has been 
ineffective in having any measurable effect in reducing greenhouse gas emissions (Almer, C., & 
Winkler, R., 2017).  Conversely, numerous academics agree that while the greenhouse gas 
emission goals set forth in the Kyoto Protocol have fallen short, the main contribution of this 
legislation was in taking the groundbreaking step to bring worldwide awareness to the threat of 
climate change; the idea that this milestone policy exists in and of itself is a success (Manne, A. 
S., & Richels, R. G., 1999).  Nonetheless, the failure to set binding greenhouse gas targets for all 
members who adopt and ratify this agreement, not exclusively developed nations, is the primary 
shortfall of the Kyoto Protocol.  The failure of the United States to ratify this agreement does not 
set the leadership example that a new Marshall Plan demands. 
Formal diplomatic tools such as the Majuro Declaration and the Kyoto Protocol can 
undoubtedly serve as a solid foundation for a new Asia-Pacific Marshall Plan, but in addition to 
these formal pathways unconventional diplomatic steps necessitate consideration.  The Center 
for New American Security recommends engaging with the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(APEC) Council to correlate climate change mitigation efforts directly with economic growth 
(Femia, F., & Werrell, C. E., 2015).  The primary objective of APEC continues to promote 
innovative and sustainable economic prosperity to the nations of the Asia-Pacific, and the impact 
that climate change will have on economic progress remains impossible to ignore.  Researchers 
agree that by leveraging the power of APEC member-states and focusing their attention on 
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climate change as a significant barrier to economic surplus, a powerful new apparatus can be 
utilized (Business Asia, 2008). 
Lastly, a significant component of American-led diplomatic efforts in the Asia-Pacific 
will be the continued participation in humanitarian aid and disaster relief (HA/DR) missions.  
The Pew Research Center Global Attitudes and Trends project shows that military-led aid 
missions often have short-term impacts on public perceptions of the United States (Wike, R., 
2015).  A long-term disaster risk reduction program focused on climate change that has 
continuous engagement from the United States as well as all regional partners remains urgently 
needed.  Researchers from the Center for Climate and Security agree that the diplomatic benefits 
from an established disaster risk reduction program in the Asia-Pacific could reap the rewards far 
into the future, and improve relations with non-allied nations to a higher degree than infrequent 
humanitarian aid or disaster response missions (Femia, F., & Werrell, C. E., 2015). 
Pillar II: Development 
Although diplomacy will play a critical role in the creation and execution of a new 
Marshall Plan for the Asia-Pacific, diplomacy without an equal effort towards development will 
fail to make any lasting impact on the region.  The current literature suggests that climate change 
development strategies are unsuccessful due to the limited accessibility to reliable financial 
resources from first-world countries (Carroll, T., 2014).  Intermediary financial support from 
organizations such as the World Bank, with reserve funds for countries who are at the highest 
risk from the consequences of climate change, need to be created and sustained.  This financial 
resource provides an opportunity where the United States can make a lasting impact in both 
commitment and action. 
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The Green Climate Fund (GCF), established by the United Nations in 2010, faces 
criticism and support from both sides of academia.  Opponents of the fund point to the fact that 
the endowment continually fails to raise the necessary capital, while also failing to provide 
transparent safeguards to prevent social and economic misuse (Kumar, S., 2015).  The fund 
recommends over 100 billion dollars to be in the account by the year 2020; however, as of 2015, 
the endowment only had custody of 852 million dollars (Kumar, S., 2015).  Proponents for the 
GCF argue that the fund acts as an essential mechanism that works hand-in-hand with the Kyoto 
Protocol since the primary objective of the GCF facilitates channeling funds into mitigation and 
adaptation strategies (Markandya, A., Antimiani, A., Costantini, V., Martini, C., Palma, A., & 
Tommasino, M., 2015).  Although the GCF acts as an essential ancillary step with the Kyoto 
Protocol, the United States should seize the opportunity to progress Asia-Pacific development 
through unilateral and bilateral interventions. 
Since 2011, the United States Agency for International Development Climate Change 
Adaptation Project Preparation Facility for Asia and the Pacific (USAID ADAPT Project) has 
funded 36 adaptation projects in 14 countries in the Asia-Pacific (USAID, 2017).  The USAID 
ADAPT Asia-Pacific Final Report states that the United States has utilized over 576 million 
dollars to the benefit of over one million people throughout the region (USAID, 2017).  The 
Asian-Pacific Adaptation Network (APAN) reports that the funds from USAID ADAPT projects 
have fulfilled their stated purpose by building technical knowledge, preparing projects for 
financing, and strengthening regional mitigation frameworks (APAN, 2013).  However, several 
authors also claim that the funds USAID ADAPT projects use may be more beneficial in the 
development of sustainable, renewable energy sources as opposed to mitigation and adaptation 
projects (Cooper, R. N., 2012).  Since the greenhouse gas emissions from the richest and largest 
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countries contribute the most to climate change, academics argue that funds of this magnitude 
should supply efforts to reducing greenhouse gases in the countries most responsible for the 
climate crisis through the use of technological development (Cooper, R. N., 2012).  There 
remains an opportunity for the United States to not only fund unilateral mitigation and adaptation 
projects, but to simultaneously transfer developing technologies to climate change partners 
throughout the region (Zhang, W., & Pan, X., 2016). 
High-value development projects on the scale of a new Marshall Plan will require 
bipartisan support throughout the American government.  Fortunately, bipartisanship of this level 
has recent precedent.  The United States Congress established the Millennium Challenge 
Corporation (MCC) in 2004 as a foreign aid agency completely separate from USAID (§ Pub. L. 
108-199, Div. D, Title VI, 2003).  With a budget of nearly 800 million dollars (MCC, 2018), the 
MCC has the potential to serve as a valuable tool for development in a new Marshall Plan where 
the scope of the MCC encompasses not just poverty alleviation, but climate change adaptations, 
mitigations, infrastructure improvements, and energy sustainability projects.  However, 
academics remain highly critical of the selection process for countries to qualify for MCC aid 
grants.  The research suggests that the assessment process for country application into the MCC 
program undermines the governing principles of the MCC by requiring receiving countries to 
achieve self-sustaining economic growth (Lebovic, J. H., 2014).  Self-sustaining economic 
growth proves to be counter-intuitive to the threats posed by climate change.  Additional critics 
of the MCC argue that other donor organizations, including USAID, will withhold aid from 
countries receiving MCC grants since they see MCC funds being used instead of, not in addition 
to, existing foreign aid assistance (Dornbusch, R., Nölling, W., & Layard, R., 1993).  Proponents 
in academia argue that the MCC deserves admiration because of the mandate that requires 
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receiving governments to enact ongoing infrastructure maintenance practices and policies to 
safeguard the four billion dollars in investments the MCC has made to Asia-Pacific countries 
(Benyishay, A., & Tunstall, R., 2011).  While the MCC certainly plays a role in advancing 
United States national interest by only investing in “good governance” countries, certain aspects 
of the MCC can apply to a new Marshall Plan; mainly investment upkeep and maintenance 
practices. 
Pillar III: Defense 
The United States Department of Defense (DOD), and in particular the United States 
Navy (USN), already has a significant presence in the Asia-Pacific.  In 2011, President Barack 
Obama announced his intention to shift American defensive priorities from the Middle East to 
the Asia-Pacific.  The release of various strategic publications following this announcement 
further defined the Asia-Pacific rebalance: the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United 
States (NDS), the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG) and the 2014 Quadrennial Defense 
Review (QDR).  These cornerstone documents lay out the intent of the United States to 
“rebalance to the Pacific to preserve peace and stability in the region” (Office of the Secretary of 
Defense, 2014, & Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2011).  Although the United States has recently seen 
conflict in two simultaneous wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, many senior military officials, 
civilian defensive analysts, and policy-makers welcome this change in strategic objectives 
(Sutter, R. G., Brown, M. E., Adamson, T. J., Mokizuchi, M. M., & Ollapally, D., 2013).  
However, numerous scholars and analysts agree that the Pacific rebalance requires execution to 
be in alignment with national strategic objectives, and not purely for political interests (Lai, D., 
Troxell, J. F., & Gellert, F. J., 2018). 
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In addition to the 2018 NDS, the 2014 QDR, and the 2012 DSG, the United States Navy 
published the Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower.  This document focuses on the 
importance of the Indo-Asia-Pacific region and acknowledges the inextricable linkage between 
American security and economic prosperity throughout this territory.  The document outlines 
how the United States Navy will expand the scope of Asia-Pacific operations to account for 
rising trade volumes and economic frictions encountered in this Area of Responsibility (AOR).  
The Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower links the strategic interests of the United 
States with the importance of strengthening cooperation between our regional allies (Department 
of the Navy, 2015).  However, a critical aspect of this document emphasizes the need to develop 
new partnerships with non-allies, particularly Bangladesh, Brunei, Vietnam, India, Pakistan, and 
Indonesia (Department of the Navy, 2015).  Some academics agree that this long overdue and 
necessary rebalance, with a focus on naval presence and increasing partner capabilities through 
strategic relationship-building, should remain at the forefront of theater planning (Conway, J. T., 
Roughhead, G., & Allen, T. W., 2008).  While the literature suggests that the attitudes towards 
the strategic rebalance are favorable, there remain some shortfalls with this guidance.  
Researchers agree that specific vulnerabilities remain, such as fleet manning requirements, 
acquisition priorities, and concrete, actionable guidance on how partnerships with non-allied 
nations should be cultivated (Moore II, C. C., 2011). 
Further criticism of this strategy points to the failure of accounting for social and 
environmental vulnerabilities that are driving changes throughout the region (Till, G., 2008).  
While humanitarian aid and disaster relief missions are an essential part of the overall strategy, 
they should not exclusively be the strategy.  The creation of a new Marshall Plan with a resolute 
focus on developing strategic theater-partnerships through the use of military-to-military (Mil-
A MARSHALL PLAN FOR THE ASIA-PACIFIC 26 
Mil) and military-to-civilian (Mil-Civ) bi-lateral programs that revolve around climate change 
issues can improve these gaps in defense policy.   
The increasing frequency of humanitarian disasters throughout the Asia-Pacific point to 
the dire need to address the causal factors of climate change.  However, in the interim, a new 
Marshall Plan needs to align the military capabilities of the Department of Defense with the 
response requirements of private organizations operating in the region.  The Asia-Pacific 
Conferences of Military Assistance to Disaster Relief Operations (APC-MADRO), with 
sponsorship from the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
(UNOCHA), publishes regional guidelines for the use of military assets in concert with civilian 
organizations.  Numerous foreign agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) utilize 
these guidelines to improve efficiency and effectiveness of foreign aid missions within their 
operating space.  The APC-MADRO can serve as a force multiplier alongside the United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID) and build a foundation at which a new Marshall 
Plan can complement Military-Civilian coordination and cooperation.   
The United States Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) Center for Excellence for 
Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance (CFE-DM) advocates for increasing 
Military-Civilian coordination through the publication of best practices guidelines as well as 
information sharing guidebooks for mission planning.  CFE-DM further emphasizes the close 
coordination between governments, militaries, and the private sector in order to multiply surge-
capacities in times requiring life-saving assistance.  Researchers agree that by expanding the 
scope of direct Mil-Civ and Mil-Mil engagement through USINDOPACOM, host nations can 
build climate change resilience and adaptations that will prove to be favorable to the strategic 
interests of the United States (Femia, F., & Werrell, C. E., 2015). 
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Although Military-to-Civilian engagement will prove critical to a new Marshall Plan, 
direct bi-lateral and multi-lateral commitments with senior defense ministers throughout the 
region will be required.  Forums for such collaborations are already in place where a new 
Marshall Plan could expand.  The Shangri-La Dialogue, also known as the Asia Security 
Summit, provides a forum for discussion on regional security threats attended by defense 
ministers, civilian policy-makers, and senior military staff.  At the 17th annual Asia Security 
Summit in 2018, dozens of defense ministers participated in an open dialogue about the future 
security risks of climate change.  Regional defense ministers and politicians agree that the 
changing climate results in maritime security issues with cascading consequences that were 
previously unforeseen (Tebbe, S., 2018).  Piracy, and primarily, illegal, unreported and 
unregulated fishing has national security implications and stimulates rising regional tensions 
(Fetzek, S., 2018). 
In addition to the Shangri-La summit, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) conducts the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting (ADMM) annually, providing 
another opportunity for defense-inspired engagement.  Though the ADMM typically strengthens 
military cooperation through mechanisms like intelligence sharing and joint coordination in the 
fight against terrorism, the defense meeting offers yet another opportunity for partnership on 
climate change security issues.  The United States Mission to ASEAN pushes for more 
aggressive and sustained military-to-military coordination in this effort and encourages further 
political and economic cohesion to advance these relationships (ASEAN, 2017).  Policy-makers 
and researchers agree the ADMM has promise as a vehicle for climate change defense 
coordination and warrants pursuit by USINDOPACOM to build partnerships and defense 
resilience (Femia, F., & Werrell, C. E., 2015). 
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This literature review has shown that the idea of a new Marshall Plan for the Asia-Pacific 
to address climate change has sound historical context and modern reasoning, with academia in 
support of a wide-ranging policy of this magnitude.  Although policy and interagency 
mechanisms have changed over the last 70 years, the three pillars of the Marshall Plan all have 
current foundations that this region can utilize.  This literature review concludes that diplomatic 
instruments like the Majuro Declaration, the Kyoto Protocol, and APEC can all contribute to a 
new master policy.  Concurrently, recent conclusions from academia coincide with the idea that 
development vehicles like the GCF, the MCC, and USAID ADAPT projects can be streamlined 
and restructured for this policy with only minor adjustments to current frameworks.  Finally, in 
keeping with current strategic guidelines, increasing the scope of USINDOPACOM engagement 
throughout the region by expanding participation in conferences such as APC-MADRO, the 
Shangri-La Summit, and the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting will advance the strategic 
interests of the United States within the region while simultaneously showing the commitment 
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“The only way human beings can win a war is to prevent it.” 




The primary objective of this thesis is to investigate the feasibility and practicality of a 
new Marshall Plan for the 21st century in the Asia-Pacific region to combat the effects of climate 
change.  The researcher wants to learn what mechanisms are currently in place to aid in this 
effort, and how realigning their frameworks could facilitate passing a substantial government 
policy of this extent.  This research paper will examine the hypothesis by investigating what 
programs and policies are currently in place to support the original three Marshall Plan pillars: 
diplomacy, development, and defense.  However, the possibility of passing a large-scale 
government policy on the scale of the original Marshall Plan remains highly unlikely in the 
political environment of today.  A “new Marshall Plan for the 21st century” may resemble the 
original exclusively in terms of unity of effort between government agencies to address an 
existential threat to the strategic interests of the United States.  By aligning current policies and 
frameworks in preparation for the inevitable effects of a changing climate, when the political 
desire to fund such an effort presents itself the mechanism to act will already be in place. 
Research Approach 
Research into a new Marshall Plan addressing climate change in the Asia-Pacific in the 
21st century will consist of document analysis following the guidance set forth by O’Leary 
(2014), Creswell (2009), and Bowen (2009).  According to Bowen (2009), “document analysis is 
a form of qualitative research in which documents are interpreted by the researcher to give voice 
and meaning around an assessment topic.”   
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Research Problem Research Questions Research Design 
 
1. The environmental, 
societal, and economic 
impacts of climate change in 
the Asia-Pacific present a 
substantial threat to the 
strategic interests of the 
United States as well as 
global stability, prosperity, 
and security.  If these 
consequences continue to 
progress without action, a 
significant destabilizing shift 
in the global status-quo has 
the potential to change the 
trajectory of the entire region 
towards chaos and conflict.  
Due to the inextricably vast 
commercial, political, and 
military interests of the 
United States with this 
region, the United States has 
an obligation to take action 
against this threat. 
 
 
1. What mechanisms and 
programs are already in place 
to assist in diplomacy, 
development, and defense in 
the Asia-Pacific region? 
 
2. By realigning the 
frameworks of these 
programs, how can 
streamlining unity of effort 




3. How should the burden of 
addressing the financial 
requirements for climate 
change mitigations and 
adaptations be equitably 
divided between all 
stakeholders throughout the 
region and beyond? 
 
1. A document analysis 
investigating the realignment 
of current programs and 
policies in place to combat 
climate change will be 
conducted.  By focusing on 
diplomatic, developmental, 
and defensive mechanisms to 
address climate change, this 
thesis will continue to echo 
with the themes and intent of 
the original Marshall Plan.  
Following each document 
analysis, the author will 
present solutions to address 
gaps and shortfalls within 
each policy, and how to align 
their frameworks to maximize 
a whole-of-government 
approach. 
Table 1: An overview of the research problem, research questions, and research design. 
In addition to Bowen, Leary (2014) recommends three types of documents to use for document 
analysis research: public records, personal documents, and physical evidence.  Analysis data and 
material for this study includes texts relevant to discuss the Marshall Plan in a historical context 
and applications to the current Asia-Pacific region.  This thesis will concentrate on examining 
and analyzing government publications, foundational strategic defensive policies, open-source 
documents, and reports pertaining to foreign policy in regards to diplomacy, development, and 
defensive frameworks formerly and currently in use by the United States.  Open-source reports 
regarding the Majuro Declaration, the Kyoto Protocol, and APEC illustrate diplomatic efforts 
available to the United States Department of State to facilitate climate change engagement with 
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regional stakeholders.  Focusing on developmental financial strategies and funding mechanisms 
such as the GCF, USAID ADAPT resources, and the MCC reveal development stratagems for 
the Asia-Pacific region already in position for the United States to utilize.  Lastly, a dissection of 
unclassified foundational defensive policies that outline the “Rebalance to the Pacific” provide 
insight into defense applications to an Asia-Pacific Marshall Plan to resist climate change. By 
evaluating the 2011 National Military Strategy of the United States, the 2012 Defense Strategic 
Guidance, the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review, the 2018 National Defense Strategy, and the 
Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower for relevant contributions to a Marshall Plan for 
this area of responsibility, this capstone will demonstrate the critical role the United States 
Department of Defense will play in maintaining influence and stability through the Asia-Pacific 
territory.  By combining the Quadrennial Defense Review with the current National Defense 
Strategy of the United States in 2017, the Department of Defense displays a proactive approach 
to streamlining strategic policies.  Although as of 2019 the 2014 QDR is no longer strategic 
guidance, the document still has value, as the objectives of the text have predominantly been left 
intact in the 2018 National Strategic Guidance directive.   
Constructing a whole-of-government framework will allow for elucidation of meaning, 
development of understanding, and an extraction of gaps in the application of a wide-ranging 
policy of this magnitude.  After completing a background analysis of the principal documents in 
this thesis, an interpretation of the applicable documents will show correlating methodologies 
that demonstrate a unity of effort in order to advocate credibility for a new Marshall Plan.  By 
rearranging the lines of effort for diplomacy, development, and defense to streamline means and 
methods for applications today to resist climate change, this thesis will show the viability and 
practicality of a new Marshall Plan for the 21st century in the Asia-Pacific realm. 
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Research Limitations 
 An initial research limitation is that no all-encompassing document will provide all of the 
necessary information on how interagency frameworks overlap and interact within a 
climatological context.  The author will accomplish the objective of this capstone by realigning 
the identifiable gaps and priorities between all available programs and policies.  The presence of 
biases, both from the sources of publication as well as the agencies responsible for creating 
diplomatic, developmental, and defensive policies requires acknowledging.  Second, although 
the author of this capstone believes the United States requires a new whole-of-government 
approach on the scale of the Marshall Plan to preserve stability, prosperity, and the commercial 
interests of the United States in the Asia-Pacific region, the confirmation and conviction bias 
from the author demands recognizing in order to investigate this hypothesis thoroughly and 
preserve integrity.  The final research limitation relates to time constraints to gather relevant 
resources, conduct a thorough examination, and publish findings.  The author believes the most 
advantageous way to mitigate these limitations is to focus the document analysis on primary 
strategic documents pertaining exclusively to United States foreign policy in the Asia-Pacific.  In 
the absence of a time constraint, qualitative analysis delving into the second and third-order 
cascading effects of the economic impacts of climate change in the region would be beneficial 
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“Thanks to the Marshall Plan, the economy of the democratic part of Europe was saved...The 
success was a striking demonstration of the advantages of cooperation between the United States 
and Europe, as well as among the countries of Europe themselves.” 
-Paul-Henri Spaak, Prime Minister of Belgium, 1947-1949 
 
Document Analysis 
 This document analysis will continue to revisit the original themes of the Marshall Plan 
by focusing on the three foundational pillars in a new climate context: diplomatic tools for 
addressing climate change, development frameworks for the 21st century Asia-Pacific, and 
defensive strategic guidance for the “Rebalance to the Pacific.”  After first identifying the 
shortfalls of these policies, programs, and documents, this document analysis will then identify 
ways in which the frameworks of these pillars can be realigned to maximize a whole-of-
government approach in an effort to progress climate change mitigations, adaptations, and 
resilience in the Asia-Pacific region. 
Pillar 1: Diplomatic Tools for Addressing Climate Change 
 
The Majuro Declaration 
 The Majuro Declaration for climate leadership has been signed and ratified by 15 nations, 
including Australia and New Zealand.  The 12-page declaration delivers to United Nations 
Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon an attempt to show solidarity, as well as to sound the alarm 
highlighting the current impact that climate change is having on Pacific Island nations.  The 
Majuro Declaration is correct to point out the unprecedented social and ecological effects of 
climate change, particularly the potential for a four-degree centigrade rise by the end of the 
century (Majuro Declaration, 2013).  The objective of the declaration is to establish specific 
greenhouse gas emission reduction targets for partner nations; however, the most significant 
greenhouse gas emitters, the United States and China, were in attendance and did not participate 
in signing the declaration.  The frustration of the Island nations who have adopted the Majuro 
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Declaration is palpable.  By failing to endorse specific greenhouse gas emission reduction 
targets, the United States fails to demonstrate climate leadership to the most vulnerable of 
nations. 
However, paragraph five of the Majuro Declaration offers an opportunity for action that 
the United States can diplomatically capitalize upon.  Majuro Declaration (2013) paragraph five 
states:   
“We recognize that the necessary energy revolution and economic 
transformation to low-carbon development is an unprecedented opportunity to 
enhance our security, protect and ensure sustainability of our natural resources 
and environment, and to improve our people’s health.” 
 
Security, natural resource protection, and public health resilience are all issues that the 
Department of State can proactively engage upon; all without the overlaying guise of 
climate change mitigations.  Although the United States has not agreed to establish 
specific greenhouse gas emission targets, the transference of technology and 
sustainability solutions is a diplomatic opportunity Department of State diplomats cannot 
ignore.  By engaging Pacific Island nations with a technology-sharing relationship to 
protect economic stability, enhance physical security, and improve public health capacity, 
the United States can continue to remain an influential regional player in the fight against 
climate change; all without acknowledging climate change exists and thus remaining in 
line with political agendas of the current Presidential Administration. 
The United States should not continue this effort alone.  By partnering with 
China, India, and other significant polluters throughout the region on the basis of 
technology proliferation for Pacific Island nation climate change mitigations and 
adaptations, the United States can demonstrate strong diplomatic leadership to address 
the most urgent issues facing these small nations.  Technology transference as a means of 
A MARSHALL PLAN FOR THE ASIA-PACIFIC 35 
diplomacy aligns with the overarching goals of the original Marshall Plan.  By utilizing 
diplomatic influence with regional partners and stakeholders, the United States will 
continue to demonstrate authority and influence regardless of the specifics of the issues at 
hand.   
While the ultimate goal of the Majuro Declaration is to herald the dangers of 
unregulated greenhouse gas emissions to the Small Island Nations, the overwhelming 
majority of declaration signers are some of the smallest greenhouse gas emitters in the 
world.  If the 15 signatory nations of the declaration were to eliminate their greenhouse 
gas emissions entirely, the regional and global implications would still be relatively 
minor.  It is for this reason that technology transference to the Pacific Island nations 
should not exclusively revolve around greenhouse gas elimination, but proactive 
mitigations and adaptations for environmental security and resilience. 
The Kyoto Protocol 
 To properly analyze the Kyoto Protocol the researcher must begin by asking 
whether greenhouse gas emission reduction targets are necessary in the first place to 
achieve a meaningful difference on the global scale.  This thought experiment is the root 
of the issue that the United States has with the Kyoto Protocol, and is the primary reason 
for not ratifying the mandated reduction targets.  A further disagreement between the 
United States and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC), the creators of the Kyoto Protocol, revolves around the language of 
greenhouse gas reduction targets.  The Kyoto Protocol mandates, not requests, that the 
signatory nations meet greenhouse gas emission targets by future deadlines.  The United 
States believes that mandating nations to hit emission targets unfairly penalizes first-
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world nations, when developing nations do not have such targets, and in many cases are 
equally responsible for a significant amount of greenhouse gas emissions.  Countries such 
as China and India, significant contributors to worldwide greenhouse gas emissions, were  
not held to any requirement to reduce gases in the original version of the Kyoto Protocol.  
Instead, the Kyoto Protocol merely requests that China and India voluntarily reduce their 
emissions, with no set target or timeframe. 
In the highly competitive global economy of today, the UNFCCC should have 
foreseen the reluctance of economic powerhouse nations to handicap their economies to 
reduce emissions to an arbitrary target.  Had the UNFCCC tailored the Kyoto Protocol to 
harness the engineering and scientific capabilities of highly advanced nations like the 
United States, to incubate developing technologies on behalf of the developing nations of 
the world, the United States likely would have signed the Kyoto Protocol in this capacity. 
However, like the Majuro Declaration, there remains a diplomatic opportunity for 
the United States to re-engage with the UNFCCC on the Kyoto Protocol.  In the Annex 
for Developing Countries, page nine, paragraph nine, the Kyoto Protocol (2001) states: 
“Capacity building is crucial to developing countries, especially those that are 
particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change. The special 
circumstances of least developed countries and small island developing States 
need to be taken into account… Existing national institutions have an important 
role to play in supporting capacity building activities in developing countries.” 
 
The United States can fulfill a pivotal role throughout the Asia-Pacific by assisting in capacity 
building for the most vulnerable nations experiencing climate change.  The Kyoto Protocol 
guidance for existing national institutions to play a role in building capacity in these developing 
countries is an objective that a modern-day Marshall Plan would immediately address.  The 
Department of State has an opportunity to diplomatically leverage a core strength of the United 
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States, technological development and industrial production capacity, to transfer technology to 
these vulnerable nations.  In this process, the United States is correct in the assessment that 
mandating greenhouse gas emission reduction may not be necessary to reduce overall 
greenhouse emissions.  A whole-of-government effort to fund, develop, and proliferate 
sustainable technologies to developing countries can be the leverage that the United States 
utilizes to accomplish the objectives of the Kyoto Protocol.  Technology proliferation for 
sustainable and clean technologies, mitigations, and adaptations has the potential to be more 
effective in curtailing global greenhouse gas emissions; rather than merely setting an arbitrary 
reduction target many years into the future using existing fossil-fuel-driven technologies.  This 
logic would continue to treat the symptom of climate change, rather than the overall cause.  
Although the United States would not ratify the Kyoto Protocol within the original intent and 
guidance of the UNFCCC, this diplomatic partnership going forward would accomplish the 
overarching goals of the Kyoto Protocol, and therefore should promote sponsorship. 
The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (APEC) 
 A number of the most economically powerful nations in the world are members of the 
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (APEC), including the United States and China.  
The forum of Pacific-Rim members has the potential to be a unique diplomatic tool to leverage 
in a new Marshall Plan for the Asia-Pacific.   
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Figure 3. Members of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Council 
(Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Council, 2019) 
 
Although the primary objective of APEC is to promote free trade throughout the Asia-
Pacific realm, climate change poses a significant barrier to the ease of commerce throughout 
these oceans and waterways.  The Department of State must consider capitalizing on the climate 
challenges facing APEC members, by facilitating a dialogue between member nations and 
American institutions.  An interchange that focuses on how businesses are adapting to climate 
challenges, as well as developing and adopting new sustainable technologies is a topic worthy of 
discussing and pursuing.  A whole-of-government approach, with the Department of Commerce 
as a leading agency, should focus on financial and banking services in the Asia-Pacific, and 
investigate how climate change is affecting business markets around the region.  The mission 
statement for APEC (2019) states:  
“We are united in our drive to build a dynamic and harmonious Asia-Pacific 
community by championing free and open trade and investment, promoting and 
accelerating regional economic integration, encouraging economic and technical 
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cooperation, enhancing human security, and facilitating a favorable and 
sustainable business environment. Our initiatives turn policy goals into concrete 
results and agreements into tangible benefits.” 
 
Climate change distinctly poses a threat to nearly all of the stated objectives in the APEC 
mission statement, especially regarding efforts for facilitation of favorable and sustainable 
business environments.  A United States-sponsored dialogue on the business impacts of climate 
change could demonstrate how the United States is willing to work as an agent of change to 
alleviate the economic burden that climate change will have on APEC member-nations.  A 
proactive discussion on laws and regulations that necessitate consideration should be a 
foundational topic worth debating in this venue as well.  By acting as a banking and financial 
leader in assisting with climate-related economic impacts, the United States can develop an 
environmental business design framework to mitigate the inevitable impact a changing climate 
will have throughout APEC territories. 
The extent at which the influence of climate change will have on the economic progress 
and development of the emerging economies throughout the Asia-Pacific remains imprecise at 
this time.  However, the awareness that the barrier climate change poses to industrialized and 
non-industrialized nations to economic surplus is a variable worth planning for and mitigating.  
With the interconnected nature of global marketplaces today, and trillions of dollars of trade 
revenues passing through the Asia-Pacific region, unpredictability, conflict, and volatility in this 
critical expanse will undoubtedly have cascading economic consequences throughout the 
financial markets of the world.  However, like the original Marshall Plan of 1948, if the United 
States demonstrates a willingness to act as the stabilizing force throughout this uncertain time, 
economic surplus may still be possible for the APEC member-nations; even in the midst of an 
unpredictable and changing climate. 
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Humanitarian Aid/Disaster Relief (HADR) Missions 
 Although irregular in occurrence and scale, military humanitarian aid and disaster relief  
(HADR) missions are a diplomatic tool that will continue to play a substantial role in the Asia-
Pacific region; particularly as climate change increases the severity and frequency of large-scale 
weather phenomena.  By continuing to participate in disaster response missions for allies and 
non-allies alike, the Department of State and Department of Defense employs a valuable 
apparatus to positively influence public perception of the United States.  While the 
improvements in public perception may be temporary, the State Department has an opportunity 
to translate a short-term HADR mission into a long-term disaster risk reduction (DRR) program.  
A new Marshall Plan for the 21st century Asia-Pacific would address this overlap in diplomacy 
and development.  By creating a long-term disaster risk reduction program that tailors itself to 
the individual needs of the countries at risk, the United States can demonstrate a long-term desire 
to continue engaging with host-nations on climate change issues.  Disaster risk reduction 
programs, when implemented immediately following participation in humanitarian aid and 
disaster relief missions, can utilize the momentum from recent engagements with the United 
States.  Disaster risk reduction programs focusing on long-term mitigations and adaptations, 
instead of disaster response missions, will provide a higher return-on-investment for the United 
States in the long-term. 
Pillar II: Development Frameworks for the 21st Century Asia-Pacific 
The Green Climate Fund 
Diplomatic strategies and development frameworks provide an approach to resisting 
climate change; however, without proper funding mechanisms to facilitate meaningful 
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development, change will not progress.  The GCF offers a vehicle for development that with 
minor readjusting could parlay effectively into the framework of a new Marshall Plan.  The 
primary shortfall of the GCF is the lack of oversight to prevent social and economic misuse, as 
well as the fact that the fund currently holds only four percent of the necessary funds to mitigate 
climate change in the Asia-Pacific region (ADB, 2018).  Part of the hesitancy for countries to 
contribute to the GCF may revolve around the ambiguity regarding funds allocation.  Common 
questions surrounding loan and grant access, distribution priorities, and appropriation to non-
Kyoto Protocol members necessitate addressing.   
The original Marshall Plan provides guidance on how to navigate the allocation and 
distribution dilemma.  The original Marshall Plan distributed funds on a per capita basis.  The 
United States simply divided the total aid package value by the number of citizens in western 
Europe and transferred the applicable amount to European countries as necessary.  The only 
exception to the per-capita allocation was the United Kingdom, who received more than a per-
capita share due to the high-cost of wartime development and impending bankruptcy. 
The per-capita allocation strategy outlined by the original Marshall Plan is a viable 
solution for GCF allotments for climate change mitigations and adaptations.  As the original 
Marshall Plan did not allocate funds to all of Europe, the GCF for the Asia-Pacific should only 
distribute funds to members who have signed and ratified the Kyoto Protocol.  Furthermore, as 
the United States is not the only greenhouse gas emitter in the world, all countries in the Asia-
Pacific, including the United States, should contribute to the GCF to the degree that corresponds 
to their contribution to cumulative global greenhouse gas emissions (see Figure 4).  According to 
the Asia Development Bank (ADB), nearly 40 billion dollars are required to mitigate the impacts 
of climate change in the Asia-Pacific region.  While this amount is substantial and unrealistic for 
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the United States to contribute exclusively, countries should supply the fund in proportion with 
their current greenhouse gas emission levels.  Under this guidance, the United States would only 
be responsible for contributing 16 percent of the funds required by the ADB, which equates to 
approximately 6.4 billion dollars per year.  This number is substantially less than the original 
annual amount the United States contributed to rebuilding western Europe after World War II.  
To put this contribution amount into context further, the 6.4 billion dollar GCF contribution is 
equal to slightly under two percent of the total Department of Defense budget for fiscal year 
2020.  In addition to the United States, China would be responsible for contributing six billion 
dollars, followed by Russia (2.4 billion), Indonesia (1.6 billion), India (1.6 billion), Japan (1.2 
billion), Canada (800 million), and the rest of the region would contribute the residual funds 
between the remaining 50 members of the region. 
 
Figure 4. Largest cumulative greenhouse gas emitters between 1990 and 2011. 
(World Resources Institute, 2019). 
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In addition to supplying the treasuries of the GCF, requiring countries to contribute to the GCF 
on a cumulative emissions basis acts as a motivating factor for countries to reduce their 
cumulative greenhouse gas emissions. 
Distribution of funds, as well as security mechanisms to prevent misuse and abuse, can be 
monitored by an oversight commission representative of all members who contribute to the GCF.  
This commission should be independent of the Kyoto Protocol, as well as the UNFCCC.  Each 
member-nation should have one representative to act as an independent custodian to ensure 
quality assurance and monitor for fraud, waste, and abuse within the fund.  Furthermore, this 
commission would differentiate between the countries with the greatest need (most likely 
dependent on population), as well as most urgent need (which countries are facing urgent and 
existential threats to climate change first, such as Kiribati), and allocate funds as necessary. 
The USAID Climate Change Adaptation Project 
 While multi-national mitigation and adaptation efforts through endowments like the GCF 
play an important role in resisting climate change in the Asia-Pacific, the United States should 
continue to take part in bilateral projects through USAID.  Using USAID Climate Change 
Adaptation Project Preparation Facilities for Asia and the Pacific (ADAPT) projects to 
complement the GCF creates an opportunity for diplomacy to overlap with development 
opportunities throughout the region.  Although the United States should focus on the obligatory 
contributions to the GCF, funding USAID ADAPT projects in addition to the GCF can provide 
the United States with more control and leverage over specific development projects for partner 
nations in the territory.  Working closely with the Asian-Pacific Adaptation Network (APAN), 
USAID can directly inject funding for development projects into areas where GCF funding may 
be lacking or unavailable.  This type of bilateral action against climate change can enable a new 
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Marshall Plan to augment current financial developmental frameworks, instead of exclusively 
bearing the majority of the monetary burden. 
Allowing further control of development funds will allow the United States to focus on 
mitigation or adaptation projects that USAID and the Department of State believe to be most 
beneficial for the strategic interests on the United States in the region.  By partnering with 
APAN, the United States can utilize sources with first-hand domestic and native knowledge of 
communities that require urgent assistance.  By leveraging this relationship, USAID can make 
noticeable progress on developing relationships and associations with countries that are currently 
uncertain of the benefits that partnering with the United States will provide.  By allowing local 
populations to dictate the most critical needs for their communities, USAID will earn valuable 
rapport with societies throughout the Asia-Pacific.  The targeting of these high-impact ADAPT 
projects will show that the United States has a long-term interest in the region, and will alleviate 
a chronic issue that is brought up by Asia-Pacific nations; that the United States does not have an 
enduring commitment to the overall well-being of their countries. 
Although researchers in parts of academia believe that spending USAID ADAPT funds 
on developing sustainable technologies that address the root cause of climate change is more 
beneficial, the reality is that the long timeframes for development and proliferation will most 
likely eclipse the time available to the countries experiencing the consequences of climate 
change today.  Even technologies that may require only five to ten years to develop may prove to 
be too long for countries currently experiencing rising sea levels, coastal erosion, and food 
insecurity.  By funding projects that build climate resilience, as well as financing the urgent 
needs of Asia-Pacific nations today, USAID can augment the mitigation frameworks of those 
host nations requesting assistance, allowing them to channel funding for their mitigation and 
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adaptation strategies to combat climate change concurrently with the United States.  Facilitating 
the funding of projects host-nations identify as being the most critical, or addressing the most 
urgent needs of the host populations, the United States can fill a financial void that can have the 
highest impact on public perceptions as well as preserve cultural heritage, ecological habitats, 
and natural resources before inaction eliminates these native income sources completely. 
The Millennium Challenge Corporation 
 USAID ADAPT projects contribute significantly to the development pillar of a new 
Marshall Plan for the 21st century Asia-Pacific.  However, USAID ADAPT projects lack the sort 
of intrinsic motivation that non-allied nations may need to adopt meaningful changes that are in 
line with the views, ideals, and foreign policies of the United States.  The Millennium Challenge 
Corporation (MCC) offers that intrinsic motivation, by awarding further financial assistance to 
countries that the United States finds are in “good governance.”  Although the MCC does not 
define the term “good governance,” the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for 
Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP) (2019) defines good governance as having:  
“…eight major characteristics. It is participatory, consensus oriented, 
accountable, transparent, responsive, effective and efficient, equitable and 
inclusive and follows the rule of law. It assures that corruption is minimized, the 
views of minorities are taken into account and that the voices of the most 
vulnerable in society are heard in decision-making. It is also responsive to the 
present and future needs of society.” 
 
While the MCC utilizes good governance (see Figure 5) as a determining criterion to 
distribute financial assistance for development projects, the idea of holding nations to a “good 
governance” standard is ambiguous and potentially unrealistic for some nations to maintain.  
Some of the challenges facing developing nations are endemic in the “good governance” 
definition, particularly being effective, efficient, inclusive, and transparent.  The MCC 
framework should undergo restructuring to accommodate the specific and unique needs of 
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developing countries in the Asia-Pacific on a case-by-case basis.  Many countries may struggle 
with transparency, while others may find being effective and efficient challenging due to 
infrastructure limitations.  These conditions alone should not preclude Asia-Pacific nations from 
MCC funds. 
 
Figure 5. The eight principles of good governance. 
(UNESCAP, 2019) 
 
Achieving self-sustaining economic growth for these countries, another requirement from 
the MCC, is a second pervasive challenge developing countries encounter throughout the region.  
One application for the MCC in a 21st century Marshall Plan, in addition to development 
projects, is to augment developing nations obligatory contributions to the GCF.  This could 
alleviate part of the burden of GCF contributions for smaller nations, allowing for funding of 
sustainable and clean technology adaptations with domestic and indigenous funding.  If a 
developing country cannot contribute their full amount to the GCF, the MCC could lend 
assistance on an annual basis if necessary.  The MCC maintains a budget of over 800 million 
dollars (MCC, 2018), which can considerably aid developing-nation contributions to the GCF.  
By using the MCC is this effort, MCC grants could allow nations to address climate challenges 
in their way, with their funds, and on their timelines. 
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Another critique of the MCC is that other aid organizations, including USAID and non-
governmental organizations, may withhold aid to developing nations if they are already receiving 
MCC grants.  By utilizing MCC funding to augment GCF contributions, other funding, grant, or 
development sources would have the transparency that they desire to ensure there is no 
duplication of effort.  However, in addition to GCF assistance, when direct development 
programs are necessary in place of or in addition to GCF assistance, the MCC can continue to 
sponsor and facilitate responsible maintenance and investment upkeep programs for climate 
change mitigation projects.  These maintenance programs are often a secondary notion in the 
details of large-scale development projects, and by adding longevity to existing or future 
development ventures, the MCC can continue to serve as a useful tool for a Marshall Plan of the 
21st century. 
Pillar III: Defensive Strategic Guidance for the “Rebalance to the Pacific” 
The Department of Defense 
 Under a new Marshall Plan for the 21st century Asia-Pacific, the Department of Defense 
will continue to have a stabilizing and supportive role throughout the region.  Recent strategic 
policy guidance calls for a significant restructuring and strengthening of military forces in 
preparation for a more robust and visible presence in crucial Asia-Pacific territories.  Increasing 
patrols to promote freedom of the seas and enforcing international law will continue to be a 
foundational mission-set under a new Marshall Plan.  Operations such as monitoring vital 
shipping straits and patrolling contested exclusive economic zone territories will demonstrate to 
regional partners the commitment of the United States to ensure the prosperity and security of 
their nations.  Failing to accomplish these objectives will result in potentially dramatic 
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implications for U.S. foreign policy in the Asia-Pacific.  The 2018 National Defense Strategy of 
the United States (2018) pointedly states:  
“The costs of not implementing this strategy are clear. Failure to meet our 
defense objectives will result in decreasing U.S. global influence, eroding 
cohesion among allies and partners, and reduced access to markets that will 
contribute to a decline in our prosperity and standard of living.” 
 
By implementing a new Marshall Plan that leverages military power in a relationship-
building capacity, the United States can resist the hegemony that other regional powers strive for, 
and preserve the global preeminence of American fighting forces.  The National Defense 
Strategy also lists priorities that are necessary in order to ensure the accomplishment of strategic 
objectives, and the foremost priority resides in the Pacific.  The Defense Strategy (2018) states:  
“We will strengthen our alliances and partnerships in the Indo-Pacific to a 
networked security architecture capable of deterring aggression, maintaining 
stability, and ensuring free access to common domains. With key countries in the 
region, we will bring together bilateral and multilateral security relationships to 
preserve the free and open international system.” 
 
The guidance set forth by the National Defense Strategy in regards to the Asia-Pacific is directly 
in line with the objectives that a new Marshall Plan would strive for in the Asia-Pacific area of 
responsibility.  The emphasis on expanding partnerships with allies and non-allies is a 
cornerstone objective that a new Marshall Plan should be built.  The impacts from climate 
change have the potential to strain and test even the strongest of relationships, and by proactively 
engaging with partner nations the United States can mitigate these stressors. 
The 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance is the document that most directly connects and 
addresses the complex nature of the difficult challenges facing the region.  In addition to 
common challenges, the Defense Strategic Guidance calls for an “expanding of networks of 
cooperation with emerging partners (DSG, 2012),” in order to sustain and protect the growth of 
the region.  The challenges facing climate change can serve as an anchor to establish the 
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cohesion that the Department of Defense desires in the Asia-Pacific.  Nations such as Vietnam, 
Indonesia, and Malaysia, who are currently in a non-ally status, are in critically strategic regions 
of the Asia-Pacific territory.  The single point of commonality that eclipses the political 
differences between these nations is the belief that climate change will have destabilizing effects 
within their regions.  By sponsoring, coordinating, and executing bilateral and multilateral 
engagements with these nations to address climate change, the Department of Defense has a 
valuable opportunity to demonstrate how a cohesive unity of effort benefits all parties. 
The Department of the Navy 
 While all agencies within the Department of Defense will be engaging with the Asia-
Pacific region in a new Marshall Plan, the United States Navy is the service branch that will most 
visibly participate with partner nations to address climate change.  The United States Navy fully 
grasps the security implications for the region, and the Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century 
Seapower is the document that most directly links the security of the Asia-Pacific with the 
economic prosperity of the United States.  A new Marshall Plan would rely upon naval assets to 
gain access to and maintain a presence in the vast region that is the Asia-Pacific.  The ocean 
domain provides the means to project influence most effectively and demonstrates a shared 
medium between all of the countries bordering the Indian and Pacific oceans.   
However, the most crucial aspect of the 21st Century Seapower directive is the 
importance of direct bilateral engagements with China.  The growing Chinese naval presence 
throughout the Asia-Pacific presents an opportunity that a Marshall Plan to combat climate 
change can expand upon.  China demonstrates the ability to participate as a partner in the region 
by contributing to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations, deploying a hospital 
ship to developing nations in the region, as well as partaking in multinational exercises.  By 
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partnering with a rising power such as China, the United States can reduce the potential for 
miscalculation, escalation, deter aggression, and promote stability; all in addition to taking the 
highly visible step of putting political issues aside to address the social and environmental 
challenges throughout the region.  Large-scale multi-national exercises such a Pacific 
Partnership, Cobra Gold, and Rim-of-the-Pacific (RIMPAC) provide direct opportunities for 
these engagements to occur.  Bilateral engagements of this kind will prove to be critical to the 
success of a new Marshall Plan in the Asia-Pacific. 
The United States Indo-Pacific Command & Civil-to-Military Engagement 
 The increasing frequency and severity of natural meteorological phenomena that the 
Asia-Pacific region is likely to experience due to a changing climate will inextricably require the 
United States Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) to have a larger operational footprint in 
the territory.  The emergent crisis climate change presents to all regional stakeholders will 
require the Department of Defense to partner with civilian organizations to assist in mitigation 
and adaptation strategies.  A new Marshall Plan for the 21st century Asia-Pacific will realign the 
strategic objectives and capabilities of the military, with the response requirements of civilian 
organizations operating in the region.  An overlapping framework involving climate change 
mitigations and adaptations built in partnership with USAID for the Asia-Pacific can act as a 
force-multiplier in the fight against climate change.  In addition to USAID, USINDOPACOM 
can utilize in-house civilian departments, such as the Center for Excellence for Disaster 
Management and Humanitarian Assistance (CFE-DM) to proactively coordinate with foreign 
agencies and non-governmental organizations.  By sending representatives to partake in the 
Asia-Pacific Conferences of Military Assistance to Disaster Relief Operations (APC-MADRO), 
USINDOPACOM can exhibit the presence and commitment to regional civilian partners that 
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demonstrates a long-term pledge to address a threat that has the potential to destabilize nations 
throughout the region. 
Military-to-Military Engagement Through The Shangri-La Dialogue & ASEAN 
Direct multi-lateral commitments with nations throughout the Asia-Pacific will prove to 
be a foundational step in a new Marshall Plan for the 21st century.  Similar in the way in which 
the original Marshall Plan led to the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (see 
Figure 6), a coalition of military alliances throughout the Asia-Pacific territory could 
complement current and future stabilization efforts by the Department of Defense.  As the effects 
of climate change continue to morph the Asia-Pacific area-of-responsibility in unpredictable and 
volatile ways, a Pacific-Asian Treaty Organization (PATO), could be a force multiplier to 
address these transformations (see Figure 7).  If the United States takes proactive steps to form a 
Pacific-Asian Treaty Organization, the Department of Defense is more likely to cultivate an 
alliance that aligns with the foreign policies and strategic objectives of the United States.   
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Figure 6. Current members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 
(Peter, 2014, NATO Member Countries, Retrieved from 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-29030744) 
 
While the primary objective of NATO is to safeguard the freedom and security of the 
member-nations within the treaty through political or military means, PATO could not only 
fulfill these same obligations in the Asia-Pacific, but also form a robust response, recovery, 
mitigation, and preparedness mechanism that supports the humanitarian aid and disaster relief 
requirements of the future.  By focusing on communications interoperability, cohesive logistics 
support, and integrating command-and-control networks, PATO would simultaneously address 
the growing military requirements within the region, as well as strengthen the resiliency of the 
member-nations in regards to climate change. 
To develop a treaty alliance that aligns with the strategic objectives of the United States, 
initial Pacific-Asian Treaty Organization membership would include critically strategic nations 
who currently maintain close diplomatic ties with the United States.  These core nations would 
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include Japan, Australia, the Republic of Korea, the Philippines, India, Thailand, Singapore, 
New Zealand, South Africa, and Taiwan.  As the PATO alliance coalesces, the United States and 
PATO core members should engage with neighboring countries throughout the region to pledge 
membership to develop a unified and stabilizing coalition throughout the region.  Countries such 
as Vietnam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Bhutan, Nepal, Oman, and the African 
nations of Kenya, Tanzania, Mozambique, and Madagascar are all critical to the long-term 
success of such an alliance.  By pursuing these equally-important countries, which historically 
may have held animosity towards the United States, shows a long-term commitment to the 
region to prepare for and resist climate change.  This engagement will show that the United 
States has an obligation to the region that eclipses political and ideological differences.  While 
diplomatic engagement will undoubtedly play a role in the formation of a treaty alliance in the 
Asia-Pacific, the most accessible and immediate means is through a multitude of defensive 
devices. 
The Shangri-La Summit is an ideal venue to propose such an alliance.  Military-to-
Military partnerships have the potential to further advance strategic as well as economic 
relationships.  Approaching partner and future-partner nations at the annual Asian Security 
Summit will utilize the forum in a way which investigates the practicality and feasibility of a 
treaty of this kind.  The forum is ideal for initial engagement due to the fact that the audience is 
not just defense ministers, but also politicians, senior military staff, and civilian policy-makers.   
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Figure 7. Perspective Pacific-Asian Treaty Organization (PATO) nations. 
(Rollins, 2019, PATO Member Countries, Retrieved from mapchart.net) 
 
While the ultimate goal of a new Marshall Plan in the Asia-Pacific is to combat climate 
change, a preliminary step to accomplishing this objective likely requires the development of a 
military relationship first.  A united and capable military alliance can easily transition from 
accomplishing a military objective to organizing against an environmental threat.  Many Asia-
Pacific nations already view climate change as an equally hostile foe, on par with historical 
ideological disagreements between regional neighbors.  These nations also foresee the linkage 
between climate change and maritime security, and time is of the essence in developing an 
alliance to mitigate these impending issues. 
    Following the Shangri-La Summit, the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting (ADMM) 
is an avenue that is ripe for Mil-Mil engagement.  While an initial proposal for a Pacific-Asian 
Treaty Organization should occur at the Asian Security Summit, the ADMM is a logical 
continuation to such a proposition.  At the ADMM, Defense Ministers throughout the Asia-
Pacific can fine-tune specific aspects of Mil-Mil engagement at the tactical, operational, and 
strategic levels.  The core members of PATO can rely upon the existing NATO framework for 
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legal and operational authorities while tailoring the alliance to the specific challenges of the 
Asia-Pacific theater.  The United States can encourage and foster this alliance by continuing to 
invite member-nation militaries to participate in regional military exercises, partaking in military 
personnel exchange programs, and continuing to strive towards seamless interoperability 
between military assets.  By sponsoring and promoting a regional alliance of this scale, the 
United States will continue to maintain the supremacy of influence throughout the region, while 
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“I believe that, in years to come, we shall look back upon this undertaking as the dividing line 
between the old era of world affairs and the new - the dividing line between the old era of 
national suspicion, economic hostility, and isolationism, and the new era of mutual cooperation 
to increase the prosperity of people throughout the world.” 
-Harry S Truman, President of the United States, 1945-1953 
 
Conclusion 
While an initial comparison between post-World War II Europe and the post-climate 
change Asia-Pacific of the 21st century may seem incongruous, the parallels between these 
former and current existential threats required investigation.  This thesis aimed to illustrate and 
tailor the pillars of diplomacy, development, and defense in the original Marshall Plan to a new 
climate-focused context in the present day.  This thesis provides the historical context of the 
Marshall Plan and illustrates how the policy was successful in maneuvering the United States 
and the rest of Western Europe through the uncertainty following a massive global conflict.  The 
success of the original Marshall Plan in traversing regional and global insecurity was worthy of 
investigation for lessons and insights that can be carried forward to today.  The amplifying 
effects of a changing climate only aggravate the complex sociopolitical, and economic 
vulnerabilities endemic to the Asia-Pacific territory.  While the world looks to the nations 
surrounding the Indian Ocean, and those of South and Southeast Asia as the manufacturing and 
future economic nuclei of the globe, the threats posed by climate change will inevitably 
challenge this region with instability and uncertainty.  The social and economic providence of 
the United States links invariably to this territory, and without a robust plan to develop 
adaptations, mitigations, and progress climate change resilience, the United States will 
inextricable suffer alongside this vulnerable region when the worst effects of climate change 
occur. 
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This thesis has demonstrated and focused attention on three critical issues pertaining to 
climate change in the Asia-Pacific: 
1. While numerous agencies and institutions have called upon the creation of a new Marshall 
Plan for the Asia-Pacific, no executable framework previously existed.  This thesis addresses 
that deficit by outlining current diplomatic, developmental, and defensive policies and 
frameworks that can be best realigned and utilized in the creation of a new Marshall Plan for 
21st-century climate threats. 
 
2. By outlining a plausible and equitable framework for funding allocations for climate-related 
mitigation and adaptation expenses, this thesis expedites the creation of a new Marshall Plan for 
the Asia-Pacific by preemptively planning for such a requirement. 
 
3. This thesis has clarified how a whole-of-government approach to combat climate change will 
reduce human suffering, minimize global environmental strife, and maintain a favorable bearing 
towards the United States, all while simultaneously achieving critical strategic objectives within 
the region. 
 
This thesis successfully satisfied the desired research objectives by identifying viable 
diplomatic mechanisms that the United States Department of State can utilize through the 
creation of a new Marshall Plan.  By participating in the Majuro Declaration, contributing to the 
Kyoto Protocol in a means acceptable to the current Administration as well as partner nations, 
and leveraging the member-states of APEC to remove the climate change-induced barriers to 
economic surplus, the United States can maintain a position of influence throughout the region. 
In addition to diplomatic tools, by realigning GCF contributions and appointing an 
oversight committee to prevent misuse and abuse, the United States can address many of the 
apprehensions that surrounding nations have in terms of GCF contributions.  However, the 
United States should contribute an equitable amount to the fund that is coincident to cumulative 
greenhouse gas emission levels; all in addition to current USAID ADAPT and MCC funding 
allocations. 
The Department of Defense is proactively realigning current strategic guidance through 
the National Defense Strategy as well as the Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower.  
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The strategic guidance directed for the Asia-Pacific directly overlaps with the desired objectives 
of a new Marshall Plan, sharing commonality with regional partners in the effort to resist climate 
change.  Venues such as the Asian Security Summit, the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting, 
and APC-MADRO further contribute towards partner engagement, where the creation of a 
Pacific-Asian Treaty Organization can be presented, discussed and shaped to meet the emerging 
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“Churchill's words won the war; Marshall's words won the peace.” 
-Dirk Stikker, Foreign Minister of The Netherlands, 1948-1952 
 
Contributions, Recommendations, & Future Research 
This thesis contributes to the literature regarding climate change and the Asia-Pacific 
region by outlining constructive and actionable efforts, policies, and frameworks that can be 
realigned to achieve a whole-of-government effort in the fight against climate change.  By 
identifying limitations, shortfalls, and gaps in currently existing diplomatic, developmental, and 
defensive apparatuses, this thesis has offered solutions that allow an avenue for forward progress 
on climate change policy. 
Upon the completion of this document analysis, this thesis offers the following 
recommendations and future research topics to continue the advancement of climate change 
efforts for the Asia-Pacific region in the 21st century: 
1. The United States must assume a position of leadership on climate change policy.  As long as 
the United States continues to omit or deny the impending impacts of climate change, other 
nation-state actors within the region will rise to fill the void.  The resulting diplomatic, 
economic, and socio-political climate will not be favorable to the strategic interests of the United 
States. 
 
2. The United States must commit to the funding, development, and proliferation of clean and 
sustainable energy solutions.  These solutions must evolve past current fossil-fuel reliant 
technologies, and most importantly, be open-source in description and shared with other large 
polluters in the world, specifically China and India. 
 
3. In following with the collective defense objectives of NATO, the Asia-Pacific realm should 
contemplate a theater-specific treaty organization of their own.  As climate change threatens to 
destabilize the region, a unified force intent on providing stabilization efforts, preventing conflict 
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